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Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor 
market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth 
effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of 
senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of 
fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as 
a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's' talents' and decision-making responsibil- 
ity, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment 
agreement. 
I. Introduction 
The literature on wage dynamics and property fights suggests that certain 
characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the labor 
market for managers make shareholder wealth dependent upon continued 
employment of an incumbent manager. Becker (1964) and Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian (1978) argue that the compensation package required to retain an 
incumbent manager with firm-specific human capital enables shareholders to 
capture some of the economic benefits associated with those firm-specific 
abilities. Harris and Holmstrom (1982), on the other hand, show that an 
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incumbent manager's continued employment can adversely affect shareholder 
wealth when the employment setting is characterized by transportable hLlman 
capital (revealed over time) and manager mobility, since future-period com- 
pensation may exceed the (ex post) value of the manager's services. In both 
settings, termination of the firm/manager employment relationship will induce 
changes in shareholder wealth if the future benefits or costs associated with the 
incumbent manager's continued employment differ from those expected from 
the replacement manager. Of course, shareholder wealth will be independent of 
the incumbent manager's continued employment or termination if perfect 
substitutes (in the form of a replacement manager) are available. 
Given capital market efficiency, these shareholder wealth effects are reflected 
in common stock price responses to the termination of the firm/manager 
employment relationship. Accordingly, we examine the common stock price 
reaction to one class of terminations: the unexpected deaths of senior corpo- 
rate executives due to heart attacks, plane or automobile crashes, suicides, and 
similar causes. Large positive and negative share price adjustments coincident 
with the unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives are documented, 
providing evidence that the (ex ante) value of the deceased incumbent differs 
from that of the anticipated replacement manager. Moreover, the size and 
direction of the share price adjustments are shown to be correlated with the 
incumbent executive's status as a corporate founder, with measures of the 
executive's 'talents' and decision-making responsibility, and with variables 
related to the transaction costs of prematurely renegotiating or terminating the 
employment contract. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
circumstances under which continued employment of an incumbent manager 
affects shareholder wealth. Sample selection procedures and selected character- 
istics of the sample are discussed in section 3, and section 4 presents the results 
of the empirical tests. Finally, the research is summarized and conclusions are 
drawn in section 5. 
2. Compensation adjustments and the managerial labor market 
This section describes the characteristics of the firm/manager employment 
relationship and of the managerial labor market which make shareholder 
wealth dependent on the continued employment of an incumbent manager. 
The general thrust of the following analysis is that gains and losses from 
continued employment occur because (1) the incumbent manager possesses 
firm-specific human capital and the associated economic benefits accrue (at 
least in part) to shareholders, or (2) transaction costs limit the ability of the 
contracting parties to renegotiate the employment agreement when the in- 
cumbent manager's compensation deviates from the market-cleating price for 
the manager's services. If termination of the employment relationship is not 
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fully anticipated, the stock price response to the incumbent manager's death 
reflects the change in shareholder wealth that occurs because the (ex ante) 
value of the deceased incumbent manager's decisions, abilities and compensa- 
tion differs from that of the anticipated replacement manager) 
2.1. Effects of continued employment on shareholder wealth 
At the time of initial employment, firms competing in the managerial labor 
market assess the abilities and characteristics of each prospective manager and 
offer compensation packages commensurate with those assessments. If the 
labor market is competitive and efficient, with all firms and prospective 
managers sharing common (but perhaps incomplete) information about each 
manager's abilities and characteristics, these assessments will be reflected in the 
market-clearing price for each manager's services. 
The presence of non-transportable (firm-specific) human capital implies that 
the manager's expected marginal product to the employing firm exceeds the 
manager's value to other firms competing in the labor market. If the firm pays 
the market price (or slightly more) for the manager's services, the manager will 
accept employment thus enabling shareholders to earn positive rents. These 
rents arise because shareholders control access to a productive opportunity 
which is unique in its level of benefits from the manager's abilities. Subsequent 
to initial contracting, expenditure of personal resources to acquire firm-specific 
abilities will not improve the incumbent manager's position in the labor 
market, so the manager has little incentive t o  acquire such abilities unless 
shareholders commit to an above-market future compensation package. 
Shareholders, on the other hand, would be willing to bear the costs of 
developing the manager's firm-specific human capital to the extent that they 
can capture the expected future quasi-rents resulting from that investment 
[Becker (1964) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978)]. 2 Shareholder wealth 
is affected adversely by the unexpected death of a manager with firm-specific 
1 The benefits and costs associated with termination of the employment relationship may depend 
on whether termination occurs through dismissal, resignation, or death. For example, some 
long-term employment contracts guarantee the executive's position and salary for the duration of 
the contract period. This guarantee imposes a transaction cost (borne by shareholders) when the 
executive is fired during the contract period, but this type of transaction cost is not incurred by 
shareholders when the executive dies. Therefore, our empirical results on the shareholder wealth 
effects of unexpected executives' deaths may not generalize to other types of employment 
terminations. 
2A given period's manager-specific quasi-rent equals the difference between the value of the 
manager's productive activities and the avoidable costs of employing the manager, including the 
opportunity cost of hiring the next best alternative manager. Unlike monopoly rents, which occur 
because of restrictions to market entry, quasi-rents arise naturally in a multi-period world when 
current period investments are made with the expectation of future period returns. See Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978) for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between monopoly 
rents and quasi-rents. 
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capital, since the firm must hire a replacement and expend additional resources 
to identify and /o r  develop the new manager's firm-specific abilities. This 
adverse shareholder wealth effect would be reflected in a negative share price 
response to the manager's unexpected death. 
The preceding discussion assumes that shareholders control access to a 
unique productive opportunity. In other cases, access to the productive oppor- 
tunity may lie with the prospective manager, as in the case of a corporate 
founder taking the firm public. In this situation, the rents arising from access 
to the productive opportunity will accrue to the founder-manager, rather than 
to shareholders. If these rents take the form of a compensation package that 
exceeds the market-clearing price for the founder's managerial services, 
termination of the employment relationship enables shareholders to negotiate a 
more favorable employment agreement with a professional manager. This 
favorable wealth effect would be reflected in a positive share price reaction to 
the founder-manager's unexpected death. 
To the extent that the incumbent manager's abilities are transportable 
(general) rather than firm-specific, the expected value of those abilities will be 
reflected in the market price of the manager's services. This market price varies 
with organizational performance because performance outcomes provide new 
information regarding the talents and characteristics of the manager (i.e., the 
manager's job-related skills and tastes for on-the-job consumption of per- 
quisites). If shareholders and the incumbent manager can costlessly renegotiate 
the employment arrangement on a continual basis, the manager's compensa- 
tion varies with organizational performance [Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983)]. Under costless recontracting, shareholders and the incumbent 
manager are free to terminate the employment relationship at each recontract- 
ing point, and the incumbent manager's continued employment is ensured only 
if the compensation package offered by shareholders is at least as attractive as 
those packages available to the manager in the labor market. Shareholder 
wealth is independent of the incumbent manager's continued employment in 
this scenario since the manager's compensation is continually adjusted for new 
information about the manager's abilities and characteristics, as is the market- 
clearing price for all potential replacement managers. In this case, no common 
stock price reaction to the unexpected death of the incumbent manager is 
predicted. 
A number of contractual arrangements make it costly for shareholders or the 
incumbent manager (or both) to renegotiate or terminate the employment 
relationship. Manager-initiated wage recontracting is costly if stock options, 
deferred compensation, restricted stock or other forms of managerial wealth 
are forfeited when the manager voluntarily leaves the firm. If the incumbent 
manager cannot costlessly renegotiate or terminate the employment relation- 
ship and the manager's abilities are perceived to be more valuable than was 
anticipated at the time of negotiation of the current compensation package, 
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shareholders earn positive quasi-rents from the continued employment of the 
manager. This benefit accruing to shareholders ceases when the employment 
relationship is terminated and the firm must 'meet the market' for a replace- 
ment manager. Under this scenario, there is a negative stock price reaction to 
the incumbent manager's unexpected death. 
When the performance of the incumbent manager is less favorable than 
shareholders anticipated, and impediments exist that deter shareholders from 
reducing the manager's compensation or dismissing the manager, continued 
employment of the manager may impose negative quasi-rents on shareholders. 3 
For example, shareholders frequently agree to multi-period employment con- 
tracts that guarantee the manager's position and compensation for the dura- 
tion of the contract period regardless of the firm's performance. 4 Alternatively, 
shareholder-initiated wage recontracting (i.e., direct renegotiation or dismissal, 
or indirect dismissal via a proxy contest or hostile takeover) is costly if the 
manager controls a relatively large proportion of the firm's voting shares. Even 
in the absence of significant share ownership, an intransigent manager may 
take actions that increase the cost of proxy contests or decrease the probability 
of a hostile takeover. The incumbent manager's death enables shareholders to 
hire a replacement manager without incurring the costs of dismissing or 
recontracting with the former manager. Such conditions should produce a 
positive common stock price reaction to the unexpected death of the incumbent 
manager. 
2.2. Summary and general hypotheses 
The preceding analysis leads to the following hypotheses about the reaction 
of common stock prices to the unexpected death of an incumbent manager. 
First, in the absence of differences between the value to shareholders of the 
incumbent manager's services and those of the replacement manager, no 
common stock price reaction to the manager's unexpected death should be 
3Even though multi-period employment contracts impose transaction costs when recontracting 
occurs prematurely, they may not constitute an inefficiency at the time of initial contracting. 
Lambert (1983) demonstrates that bilateral commitment, where both the principal (shareholders) 
and agent (manager) commit to a two-period contract, is Pareto-superior to unilateral (principal 
only) commitment in a two-period agency situation. Medoff and Abraham (1980) present empirical 
evidence indicating that while compensation increases with experience, employee performance 
does not. Medoff and Abraham suggest that this result might arise from implicit contracts that 
guarantee employees annual pay increases regardless of their actual performance. This type of 
employer/employee relationship may be efficient if risk-neutral employers are bearing the 'ability 
risk' for risk-averse employees. 
4 Harris and Holmstrom (1982) examine a model where the principal (shareholders) commits to 
a multi-period contract but the agent (manager) may force renegotiation. While the principal 
expects to break even at the outset of the contract, the expected profit of the principal at every 
succeeding point in time is shown to be less than or equal to zero implying that the agent's 
continued employment entails negative quasi-rents. 
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observed. We refer to this 'no effects' hypothesis as the null hypothesis. 
Alternatively, if the manager's employment contract is costly to renegotiate or 
terminate during the contract period or if the manager possesses firm-specific 
human capital that would be costly to replace, shareholder wealth is affected 
by the termination of the employment relationship. 
The observed share price reaction is predicted to be negatively correlated 
with variables that measure the expected value of the incumbent manager's 
firm-specific human capital, the extent to which the manager is 'more talented' 
than previously anticipated, and the magnitude of transaction costs that 
discourage the manager from renegotiating or terminating the employment 
agreement. Conversely, observed price changes are predicted to be positively 
correlated with the manager's status as a corporate founder, and with variables 
that measure the extent to which the manager is 'less talented' than previously 
anticipated and the manager's ability to deter dismissal or renegotiation of the 
employment contract. 
3. Sample selection procedures and descriptive characteristics 
The preceding analysis predicts that certain multi-period managerial em- 
ployment arrangements affect shareholder wealth, and result in common stock 
price adjustments when there is an unanticipated termination of the employ- 
ment relationship. Three considerations influenced our decision to test this 
prediction by examining only those common stock price reactions that occur 
following the unexpected death of a senior corporate executive. First, share- 
holder wealth effects are likely to be larger for key corporate executives than 
for other employees of the firm. Second, the death of a senior executive tends 
to be a highly visible corporate event, reported by the financial press and 
various news media. Finally, our ability to detect share price adjustments 
directly attributable to the employment relationship is considerably enhanced 
by restricting the empirical tests to instances where termination of the employ- 
ment relationship was unexpected (i.e., not anticipated by market participants), 
and not confounded by other firm-specific events such as organizational policy 
disputes. For these reasons, we chose not to investigate instances of executive 
resignation, dismissal, or death from prolonged illness. 
3.1. Sample selection 
The sample consists of 53 sudden deaths of senior corporate executives (i.e., 
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, or president) which occurred 
between January 1, 1971 and December 31, 1982. A preliminary sample of 210 
events was identified by examining all obituary notices announcing the death 
of a senior corporate executive published between 1971 and 1982 in the Wall 
Street Journal lndex. The date and cause of death were verified by examining 
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obituaries published in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, or regional 
newspapers, and from information contained in corporate proxy statements, 
annual reports, and Form 10-K’s filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). These same sources provided information about the execu- 
tive’s age, position in the firm’s management hierarchy, tenure with the firm, 
and the executive’s direct or beneficial ownership of the firm’s common stock. 
The following sample selection criteria were imposed in order to increase the 
likelihood that any security price effects observed were attributable solely to 
the executive’s death: 
(1) The deceased executive was employed by a company whose daily common 
stock returns are included in the CRSP data file and both the announce- 
ment date and date of death were determinable and not coincident with 
some other firm-specific announcement. 
(2) The cause of death was not attributed to ‘prolonged illness’, ‘complications 
following surgery’ or indeterminate. 
The sample selection criteria restrict the final sample to events involving top 
level corporate executives of publicly held corporations listed on the New York 
or American stock exchanges, and minimize the probability that market 
participants anticipated the event or that new information regarding firm- 
specific confounding events (i.e., changes in firm asset values or risk character- 
istics) was being released in close proximity ( f 10 trading days) to the event. 
Of the 210 senior executive deaths included in the preliminary sample, 93 
events were disqualified from further consideration because the cause of death 
was attributed to ‘prolonged illness’, ‘complications following surgery’, or was 
indeterminate. Fifty-six events were disqualified because daily common stock 
return data are not in the CRSP file, and eight events were excluded because 
potentially confounding firm-specific news releases (announcing defense con- 
tract awards, litigation, and impending sales of assets) were published in the 
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Wall Street Journal during the 21-day period surrounding the executive's 
death. Table 1 presents the distribution of executive deaths over the period 
1971 through 1982 for the 53 events retained in the final sample. These sample 
events correspond to 53 different firms representing a diversity of industry 
classifications. 
3.2. Sample characteristics 
Summary statistics describing selected characteristics of the executives and 
the events are presented in table 2. The executives' age at the time of death 
ranged from 48 to 86 years, with the average being 61.8 years. Approximately 
19 percent of the executives were at least 70 years old while almost 7.5 percent 
were no more than 50 years old. On average, the executives had been employed 
by their respective corporations for 23 years. Thirty percent of the executives 
had been with the firm for at least 30 years while only 6 percent of the sample 
had been employed by the firm for 5 years or less. 
Seventy-two percent of the executives held the position of board chairman 
when they died, and almost two-thirds of those individuals (43.4% of the 
sample) were also employed as the chief executive officer by their respective 
corporation. Thirteen individuals (24.5%) held the position of chief corporate 
officer but not board chairman, and 4 percent were neither CEO nor board 
chairman. On average, these executives had occupied their current position 
with the firm for 13.5 years. Eighteen percent had held that position for at least 
20 years while 28 percent of the sample had occupied their current position for 
5 years or less. Fifteen individuals (28.3%) were identified as corporate founders. 
A number of the executives included in the sample directly or beneficially 
owned a significant proportion of their °firm's outstanding common stock. 
Twenty-six percent of the sample controlled at least 5 percent of the common 
shares outstanding, while 47 percent of the executives controlled no more than 
1 percent of the firm's shares. Share ownership averaged 9.5 percent, and 
ranged from zero to seventy-six percent of the outstanding common shares. 
Statistics on the cause of death underscore the unexpected nature of the 
sample events. Heart attack was cited as the cause of death in 26 cases (49.1%); 
12 events (22.6%) were attributed to accidents (typically automobile or plane 
crashes) or suicides; 6 events (11.3%) involved 'brief illnesses' of an undis- 
closed type; and the remaining 9 deaths (17.0%) were attributed to a variety of 
causes including cerebral hemorrhage and embolism. 
Among published sources, the earliest public announcement of the executive's 
death is typically provided by the Wall Street Journal obituary. For twenty-eight 
events (52.8% of the sample), publication of the obituary occurred one trading 
day after the executive's death. In 19 cases (35.9%), publication of the obituary 
occurred two trading days after the executive's death. For the remaining 6 
events (11.3%), the executive's death occurred on a day the market was closed 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for 53 instances of senior executive unexpected death in the period 1971-1982. 
Characteristics of the executives 
1. Age time of death: 
Mean age 
Executives who were 70 or older 
Executives who were 50 or younger 
2. Years employed by the firm: a 
Mean years with the firm 
With the firm 30 years or more 
With the firm 5 years or less 
3. Position in the firm: 
Board chairman 
Board chairman & chief executive officer 
Chief executive officer but not chairman 
Neither chief executive nor chairman 
Corporate founder 
4. Years in current position: a 
Mean years in current position 
In current position 5 years or less 
In current position 20 years or more 
5. Proportion of the firm's outstanding common shares 
controlled by the executive: a 
Mean percent controlled 
Executives controlling 5% or more 
Executives controlling 1% or less 
Characteristics of the event 
6. Cause of death: 
Death attributed to heart attack 
Death attributed to accidents or suicides 
Death that followed brief illnesses 
Death attributed to embolism, hemorrhage, etc. 
7. Number  of trading days between the date of death and 
publication of the Wall Street Journal obituary: 
Obituary delayed 0 trading days 
Obituary delayed 1 trading day 

























a Only 50 events are represented in the summary statistics for these items because data for the 
remaining 3 events were unobtainable. 
b These events represent instances where death occurred on a non-trading day and the obituary 
was published on the next trading day. 
(typically a Saturday or Sunday) and the obituary was published on the next 
trading day. 
4. Empirical results 
Two empirical tests are utilized to investigate the common stock price 
response to news of a senior executive's unexpected death. First, common 
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stock returns in trading periods coincident with the executive's death are 
examined for evidence of abnormal share price behavior. Second, a cross-sec- 
tional analysis of stock price reactions is performed to determine if the 
observed price adjustments are consistent with the individual shareholder 
wealth effects enumerated in section 2. The empirical methods and test results 
are described below. 
4.1. Common stock returns test procedures 
The single-factor market model [Fama (1976)] is assumed to characterize 
daily stock returns. Daily returns of the firms and the equally-weighted market 
index were collected from the CRSP tape for each of the 53 events for a 21-day 
test period (day - 10 to day + 10) and a 100-day estimation period (day - 111 
to day -11).  The event date (day 0) is defined as the trading day of the 
executive's death or the first trading day following the event, if death occurred 
on a non-trading day. 
The excess daily returns (~j,) for each stock are estimated by 
~jt= Rjt-( ~j-~ ~jRmt), (1) 
for day - 1 0  to day + 10, where R jr is the continuously compounded rate of 
return for stock j on day t, R m t  is the continuously compounded rate of 
return for the CRSP equally-weighted index on day t, &j is the (estimated) rate 
^ 
of return on stock j when Rmt  = 0, and flj is the (estimated) systematic risk of 
stock j. The market model coefficients ~j and/~j are Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimates obtained from a 100-trading-day period ending 11 days prior 
to the event date. s 
For 6 of the 53 sample events, publication of the Wall Street Journal 
obituary coincides with the event date (day 0) because the executive died on a 
non-trading day and the obituary appeared on the first trading day following 
the death. Any share price reaction associated with these events is therefore 
likely to occur on day 0. However, for approximately 89 percent of the sample, 
the Wall Street Journal obituary was published at least one trading day after 
the executive's death (see table 2). It is unclear when information about these 
47 events became available to market participants since, in a handful of cases, 
obituary announcements published in other national or regional newspapers 
are known to have preceded publication of the Wall Street Journal obituary. 
Thus, the share price reaction for firms where the Wall Street Journal obituary 
appeared two trading days after the event (35.9% of the sample) may occur on 
5 Excess daily returns were also computed using Scholes-Williams (1977) estimates of the market 
model coefficients to compensate for non-synchronous trading problems inherent in daily stock 
return data. The results obtained using this procedure were virtually identical to those obtained 
using the OLS estimates. 
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the event date (day 0), on the obituary publication date (day + 2) or over the 
entire three-day period (day 0 to day + 2). To enhance our ability to detect 
share price adjustments associated with the executive's death, the empirical 
tests focus on a firm-specific announcement period, defined as the trading 
period from the event date through the publication date of the Wall Street 
Journal obituary. If the executive's death is not anticipated, any security price 
reaction should take place during the announcement period. 
The excess daily returns (ejt) for each firm were cumulated over the 
firm-specific announcement period, and all excess returns were standardized by 
the estimated standard error of the predicted returns of the market model. 6 
Announcement period excess returns were further standardized using a factor 
reflecting the increase in variability due to cumulation over the firm-specific 
announcement period. 7 The resulting standardized excess return is denoted s jr 
where t_ 1 corresponds to the trading day preceding the executive's death, t o 
corresponds to the firm-specific announcement period, and t+ 1 corresponds to 
the trading day following publication of the Wall Street Journal obituary. 
The average standardized excess return can be examined for statistical 
significance using standard normal theory tests [Patell (1976) and Dodd 
(1980)]. 8 However, since the theoretical arguments of section 2 predict that the 
sit observed for any single security represents an aggregation of several positive 
and negative price effects, there is no a priori reason to believe that the same 
price effect pertains to all securities. If positive and negative announcement 
6 For  each security j ,  the excess return for each day of the test period is standardized by the 
square root of its estimated forecast variance to form a standardized excess return: 
/([,( )]:) Sjt=~jt (lj" 1 + - ~ +  ( R m t - R m )  2 Y'~ ( R , , r - R m )  2 , 
T=I 
where oj 2 is the estimated residual variance from the market model regression for security j ,  R,~ is 
the average market  return over the L days used for the regression, and R,, r is the return to the 
market  index at day T. 
7The announcement  period standardized excess return is computed by summing the standar- 
dized excess returns for each of the (d2j - dl: + 1) days of the announcement period, where d U 
and d2j designate the firm-specific event date and the Wall Street Journal obituary publication 
date, respectively, 
d2j / 
wj = t=~dL, S j t / ¢ d 2 j  -- dlj q-1 . 
I 
8 The statistical significance of the average excess return on day t for the N sample firms can be 
tested using the statistic 
Z =  ~ s:, N t - 4 ]  ]' 
j=l 
where sit denotes the standardized excess return on day t for firm j obtained from the market 
model regression estimated over L trading days. Tests of announcement period standardized 
excess returns are constructed in a straight-forward manner by replacing Sit with the appropriately 
defined ~ .  In the absence of abnormal performance, Z is assumed to be distributed unit normal. 
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period excess returns are observed in the sample, the average standardized 
excess return may not be statistically different from zero even though statisti- 
cally significant (but offsetting) individual share price adjustments are associ- 
ated with the event. Accordingly, the announcement period excess returns are 
also examined for evidence of abnormal cross-sectional dispersion. 
4.2. Excess returns and senior executive deaths 
Table 3 presents a time series of excess portfolio returns for the 15 trading 
days around the firm-specific announcement period (to) for the sample of 53 
executive deaths. Colunm 1 identifies the trading day relative to the announce- 
ment period, column 2 reports the portfolio daily excess return, the number of 
positive and negative excess returns for each trading day are reported in 
column 3, and column 4 reports the cumulative average excess return for the 
test period. The portfolio standardized excess return (gt) for each trading day 
is presented in column 5. 
Table 3 
Percentage common stock excess returns and standardized excess returns over a 15-day period 
around the announcement of the executive's death for 53 events in the p e r i o d  1971-1982.  a 
Excess returns Average  
Cumulative standardized 
Trading M e a n  No. positive: average excess 
day  re turn  No. negative return return 
- 10 0.25 28:25 0.25 0.17 
- 9 0.14 23:30 0.39 0.12 
- 8 0.83 29:24 1.22 0.25 b 
- 7 - 0 . 0 7  24:29 1.15 - 0 . 0 1  
- 6 - 0 . 1 3  21:32 1.02 - 0 . 0 4  
- 5 0.44 22:31 1.46 0.07 
- 4 - 0 . 1 5  21:32 1.31 - 0 . 0 3  
- 3 - 0 . 1 2  24:29 1.19 - 0 . 0 3  
- 2 - 0 . 2 1  24:29 0.98 - 0 . 0 6  
- 1 - 0 . 0 9  25:28 0.89 - 0 . 0 3  
0 0.40 24:29 1.29 0.12 
1 0.34 25:28 1.63 0.19 
2 0.30 27:26 1.93 0.06 
3 0.60 33:20 2.53 0.22 
4 0.63 30:23 3.16 0.17 
5 - 0.08 26:27 3.08 0.02 
aAnnouncement per iod  (day 0) excess returns are cumulated over the firm-specific trading per iod  
(1, 2 o r  3 days)  that begins on the date of the executive's death and ends  on the publication date of 
the Wall Street Journal obituary.  Accordingly ,  d a y  - 1  denotes the trading day preceding the 
executive's death, and  day  + 1 corresponds to the trading day following publication of the Wall 
Street Journal obi tua ry .  
bSignif icant  at the 10% level. 
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The data in table 3 indicate that (on average) a small, positive share price 
adjustment is associated with the unexpected deaths of senior corporate 
executives. The average portfolio excess return for the 10-day period im- 
mediately preceding the executives' deaths is + 0.89%. By contrast, a + 0.40% 
announcement period (to) average excess return was detected, although this 
portfolio excess return is not statistically different from zero (standardized 
excess return of + 0.12, Z = 0.86). Announcement period excess returns ranged 
from - 10.3 percent to + 20.4 percent (standardized excess returns from - 2.52 
to +5.53)  with ten firms exhibiting statistically significant announcement 
period excess returns (7 positive and 3 negative, p _< 10%). The probability of 
observing ten statistically significant excess returns by chance is less than 1.6 
percent (binomial test using a prior probability of 0.10). 
Table 4 reports the dispersion of standardized excess returns for the 
announcement period and for each of the 10 trading days preceding the 
announcement period. Three statistics are employed to describe the dispersion 
of standardized excess returns: (1) a conventional cross-sectional standard 
deviation, (2) a jackknifed estimate of the cross-sectional standard deviation, 
and (3) a mean squared standardized excess return. The statistical significance 
of each jackknifed standard deviation was assessed using Miller's asymptoti- 
cally distribution-free jackknife test [Hollander and Wolfe (1973)], and a 
Table 4 
Tests for increased dispersion of announcement period excess returns for 53 instances of senior 
executive unexpected death in the period 1971-19827  
Announcement Pre-announcement trading days 
period - 1 - 2  - 3  - 4  - 5  
Conventional standard deviation 1.55 1.08 
Jackknifed standard deviation 2.52 0.78 
(Miller's t) (2.90) b ( -  1.03) 
Mean squared return 2.37 1.16 
(Patell's Z )  (6.71) b (0.67) 
0.89 1.00 1.06 1.29 
1.14 1.23 0.74 1.47 
(0.40) (0.97) ( -  1.67) (1.41) 
0.77 0.98 1.10 1.63 
( - 1.23) ( - 0.20) (0.38) (3.01) b 
Announcement Pre-announcement trading days 
period - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 
Conventional standard deviation 1.55 1.19 0.85 1.10 
Jackknifed standard deviation 2.52 1.86 1.16 1.02 
(Miller's t)  (2.90) b (1.17) (0.55) (0.11) 
Mean squared return 2.37 1.39 0.71 1.24 
(Patel l ' s  Z )  (6.71) b (1.84) b ( -  1.53) (1.11) 
1.04 0.87 
0.81 1.22 
( - 0.81) (0.74) 
1.08 0.77 
(0.28) ( -  1.22) 
~A statistically significant value indicates that the observed distribution of standardized excess 
returns exhibits greater dispersion than is expected under the null hypothesis that excess returns 
are distributed unit normal. 
bSignificant at the 10% level. 
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normal theory test [Patell (1976)] was used to assess the significance of the 
mean squared standardized excess returns. 9'1° 
The results in table 4 indicate that announcement period excess returns are 
indeed characterized by abnormal dispersion (jackknifed standard deviation of 
2.52, t = 2.90; mean squared sit of 2.37, Z = 6.71). In contrast, only two of the 
daily excess return distributions in the pre-announcement period (t_ s and t_ 6) 
seem to exhibit unusually large cross-sectional variance, and the magnitude of 
the dispersion observed on those two trading days is considerably smaller than 
that exhibited by announcement period excess returns, n These results suggest 
that potentially important share price adjustments are associated with the 
unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives even though the average 
announcement period standardized excess return for the sample is not statisti- 
cally different from zero. 
9Miller's asymptotically distribution-free jackknife test [Hollander and Wolfe (1973)] for de- 
termining if the excess returns on day t exhibit unusually large cross-sectional dispersion is 
constructed in the following manner. For i = 1 . . . . .  N define the natural log of the sample variance 
after deleting the j = i standardized excess return as 
N N 
S i = l n  £ ( s j t - g . ) 2 / ( N - 2 )  where git = £ s j t / ( N -  1). 
j ~ l  j = l  
j ~ i  j ~ i  
Define A i = N .  S O - ( N  - 1)-S i where S o is the natural log of the sample variance computed using 
all N standardized excess returns. Compute the jackknifed estimate of the sample variance as 
N N 
A - = ( 1 / N )  ~ A i  where V = ( 1 / N ( N - 1 ) )  Y~ (A, -A- )  2 
i = 1  i = 1  
is the squared standard error of the jackknifed estimate. The statistical significance of the 
jackknifed sample variance estimate is tested using the statistic: Q = A / f - V .  In the absence of. 
abnormal cross-sectional dispersion in excess returns, Q is assumed to be t-distributed. Tests of 
abnormal cross-sectional dispersion in announcement period excess returns are constructed by 
replacing s j, with the appropriately defined ~Sr. 
1°The normal theory test [Patell (1976)] to determine if the excess returns for day t exhibit 
unusually large cross-sectional dispersion requires computation of the squared standardized excess 
return (sff,) for each security. The statistical significance of the s 2 is tested using the statistic 
Z =  ~ (LL--~_-~-s~-I 2-N.-~Z--~. l , 
j = l  
where L denotes the number of days used to estimate the market model. Tests of abnormal 
cross-sectional variance in announcement period excess returns are constructed by replacing s 2, 
with the appropriately defined D2. In the absence of abnormal share price performance during the 
test period, Z is assumed to be distributed unit normal. However, caution must be exercised when 
interpreting the results of the normal theory test. Since the test statistic is constructed directly from 
the sj,, it provides a joint test of mean and variance effects when the observed value of the sj,'s 
differ from the expected value of zero. 
11Marais (1984) has shown that empirical distributions of standardized excess returns tend to be 
fat-tailed relative to the null (Gaussian) distribution, and therefore the normal theory test 
described in footnote 10 may reject the null hypothesis more frequently than is statistically 
appropriate. Miller's asymptotically distribution-free jackknife test is less sensitive to these 
problems; however, normal theory statistics are reported so that our results can be compared with 
those of prior capital market studies. Further, it should be noted that Marais' results may partially 
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Table 5 
Average percentage excess returns and standardized excess returns for selected subsamples over a 
15-day period around the announcement of the executive's death, a 
F O U N D E R  N O N - F O U N D E R  
Other causes Brief illness 
Stdzd. Stdzd. Stdzd. 
Trading Excess excess Excess excess Excess excess 
day return return return return return return 
- 10 0.46 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.32 0.17 
- 9 0.69 0.36 -0 .08  0.03 -0 .08  -0 .04  
- 8 0.37 0.20 1.02 0.25 0.96 0.37 
- 7 - 0 . 5 9  - 0 . 2 9  0.15 0.10 0.08 0.10 
- 6 - 0 . 2 8  - 0 . 1 8  -0 .25  -0 .03  0.91 0.26 
- 5 0.53 0.30 0.32 -0 .11 0.87 0.47 
- 4 -0 .31  - 0 . 0 8  -0 .07  -0 .01 - 0 . 1 7  0.00 
- 3 0.43 0.09 - 0.28 - 0.05 - 0.62 - 0.21 
- 2 -0 .11  - 0 . 0 7  -0 .36  -0 .14  0.32 0.37 
- 1 - 0 . 7 5  - 0 . 2 8  0.13 0.08 0.39 0.03 
0 3.50 1.04 b - 1.16 - 0.33 b 0.94 0.23 
1 0.06 0.11 0.51 0.19 0.15 0.39 
2 - 0 . 9 6  -0 .31  0.93 0.25 0.11 -0 .04  
3 0.39 0.15 0.80 0.24 0.06 0.29 
4 0.95 0.28 0.32 0.05 1.48 0.51 
5 0.06 0.01 -0 .09  0.06 -0 .38  -0 .15  
Sample 
size 15 32 6 
aAnnouncement period (day 0) excess returns are cumulated over the firm-specific trading period 
(1, 2, or 3 days) that begins on the date of the executive's death and ends on the publication date 
of the Wall Street Journal obituary. Accordingly, day - 1 denotes the trading day preceding the 
executive's death, and corresponds to the trading day following publication of the Wall Street 
Journal obituary. 
bSignificant at the 10% level. 
The existence of heterogeneous share price adjustments is further under- 
scored in table 5 which presents average excess returns and standardized excess 
returns around the announcement period for two mutually-exclusive subsam- 
ples: portfolio F O U N D E R  (n = 15) corresponding to events where the ex- 
ecutive was identified as a founder of the corporation; and portfolio 
N O N - F O U N D E R  (n = 38) consisting of the remaining sample events. These 
two subsamples were selected for investigation because they represent dis- 
tinctly different managerial employment settings in that corporate founders are 
explain why the jackknife test and normal theory test yield differing results for days - 5 and - 6 in 
table 4. 
In addition to the analysis summarized in table 4, Miller's two-sample jackknife test [Hollander 
and Wolfe (1973)] was used to assess whether the dispersion of announcement period standardized 
excess returns exceeds that observed on individual trading days during the 10-day pre-announce- 
ment period. The null hypothesis of equal dispersion was rejected in 7 of the 10 comparisons 
(exceptions being days - 2, - 5 and -- 6). 
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not 'hired'  by outside shareholders. If founders capture a larger share of the 
benefits of the employment relationship in their compensation, then the 
replacement of a founding executive should give shareholders a more valuable 
stream of future net benefits. The NON-FOUNDER subsample was further 
partitioned into two groups according to whether the executive's death fol- 
lowed a 'brief  illness' (n = 6) or was attributed to other causes (n = 32). The 
'b r ie f  illness' subgroup was selected because of the possibility that market 
participants received information about the executive's health in advance of 
the event date, in which case price adjustments occurring prior to the execu- 
tive's death would reflect the shareholder wealth effects associated with im- 
pending cessation of the employment relationship. 
Over the 10-day period preceding to, the cumulative excess return for the 
F O U N D E R  and NON-FOUNDER subsamples are +0.12% and +1.06%, 
respectively, with NON-FOUNDER-Br ie f  Illness events exhibiting a + 3.02% 
cumulative excess return while the NON-FOUNDER-Other  Causes portfolio 
experienced a -0.70% cumulative excess return. Moreover, none of the daily 
excess returns over this 10-day period for any of the subsamples are statisti- 
cally different from zero. In contrast, the average announcement period excess 
return for F O U N D E R  subsample firms is + 3.50% (mean standardized excess 
return of + 1.04, Z = 3.99), while NON-FOUNDER sample events are associ- 
ated with a -0.83% average announcement period excess return (mean stan- 
dardized excess return of -0.24,  Z = -1.47). When 'brief  illness' events are 
excluded, the average announcement period excess return for the remaining 
N O N - F O U N D E R  sample firms is -1.16% (mean standardized excess return 
of -0 .33 ,  Z = -1.85).  Thus, while FOUNDER subsample firms experienced 
a statistically significant positive announcement period share price adjustment, 
N O N - F O U N D E R - O t h e r  Causes events are associated with a statistically 
significant negative announcement period price reaction. 
In summary, the market reaction test results indicate that the common 
stocks of firms experiencing the sudden death of a senior corporate executive 
do not exhibit significant average excess returns during the trading period 
between the executive's death and its announcement in the Wall Street Journal. 
However, announcement period excess returns are characterized by unusually 
large cross-sectional dispersion, and important (but heterogeneous) price ad- 
justments occurred among selected groups of sample firms. The cross-sectional 
tests described in the next section investigate whether the price adjustments 
documented here are consistent with the theoretical arguments of section 2. 
4. 3. Cross-sectional analysis of excess returns 
The share price reaction that occurs in response to the unexpected death of a 
senior corporate executive is hypothesized to vary inversely with the net benefit 
stream shareholders would have earned from the incumbent executive's con- 
t inued employment. In section 2, we identified a number of factors that 
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determine the sign and magnitude of that net benefit stream, and in this 
section we utilize measures of those factors to analyze the cross-sectional 
behavior of the share price reactions to the unexpected executive deaths. 
As previously discussed, we predict that the net benefit stream from an 
incumbent executive's continued employment will be influenced by the execu- 
tive's status as a corporate founder. The initial contracting between the 
executive and outside shareholders will depend on whether the employment 
setting is characterized as one in which a corporate founder seeks outside 
equity financing or existing shareholders seek a professional manager. We 
predict that founders are able to negotiate a larger share of the benefits created 
by the employment relationship, and this prediction is partially supported by 
the relatively large positive share price reaction to founder deaths reported in 
table 5. In the cross-sectional analysis, the variable FNDR was set equal to 1.0 
if the executive was identified as a corporate founder; otherwise FNDR was set 
equal to zero. Announcement period excess returns are predicted to be 
positively correlated with this variable. 
Substantial differences in decision-making authority are likely to exist among 
the sample of 53 senior corporate executives since nearly one-third of the 
sample (17 individuals) were employed in some capacity other than that of 
CEO. We hypothesize that the firm's CEO has unique opportunities to acquire 
firm-specific (or position-specific) human capital, and that the share price 
reaction to an executive's unexpected death will vary inversely with the degree 
to which other executives in the firm possess similar abilities. The decision- 
making responsibility and uniqueness of the abilities possessed by an executive 
are presumed to be positively related to the executive's compensation relative 
to that of other employees in the firm. Accordingly, the variable POSITION 
was defined as the incumbent executive's direct compensation paid in the year 
preceding death, divided by the direct compensation of the most highly paid 
corporate officer (excluding the deceased executive) for that same year. There- 
fore, the variable POSITION will take on high values for deceased executives 
who were paid considerably more than any of the firm's other executives, and 
values close to zero for cases where the executive is a retired CEO who receives 
little or no direct compensation but retains the title of Chairman of the Board. 
Announcement period excess returns are predicted to be negatively correlated 
with the POSITION variable, reflecting the loss of managerial abilities which 
have no close substitutes within the firm. 
Announcement period excess returns are predicted to be negatively corre- 
lated with recent firm performance because performance outcomes provide 
new information about the executive's abilities and characteristics. Recent firm 
performance was measured by a composite variable incorporating industry- 
adjusted sales growth, profitability, and returns to shareholders, each averaged 
over the three-year period preceding the executive's death. SALES GROWTH 
was defined as the firm's annual percentage change in total revenue minus the 
corresponding fiscal-year median percentage change in total revenues for the 
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industry, averaged over the three-year period ending with the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the executive's death (if death occurred during the first 
half of a fiscal year) or the fiscal year of death (if death occurred during the 
second half of a fiscal year). Three-year industry-adjusted values for PROFITS 
(reported earnings divided by the book value of shareholders' equity) and 
shareholder RETURNS (annual share price change plus dividends, divided by 
the share price at the beginning of the year) were defined in an analogous 
manner. In order to reduce multicollinearity in the cross-sectional regression 
model, these three performance measures were subjected to a principal compo- 
nents analysis and a single composite (ABILITY) was defined as 12 
ABILITY= 0.40(SALES GROWTH) + 0.44(PROFITS) 
+ 0.49(RETURNS). (2) 
Since principal components analysis rescales each right-hand side variable to 
have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, the composite variable 
ABILITY  also has a mean of zero. Announcement period excess returns are 
predicted to be negatively associated with this measure of managerial ability. 
If recent firm performance is used to reassess transportable (general) abili- 
ties, the benefits (or costs) from continued employment accrue to shareholders 
only if one of the contracting parties (outside shareholders or the incumbent 
manager) can impose transaction costs on the other party's recontracting 
initiatives. In this case, the shareholder wealth effects associated with the 
executive's continued employment are jointly dependent upon ability reassess- 
ment and costly recontracting. The ABILITY variable presumably serves as a 
measure of changes in the assessed talents of the executive, but proxies for the 
contracting parties' ability to impose transaction costs are difficult to isolate. 
Two distinct recontracting scenarios were examined in section 2. 
If an incumbent executive has performed poorly (negative values for ABIL- 
I T Y )  and can impose transaction costs that limit shareholder-initiated recon- 
tracting (dismissal, demotion or compensation reduction), shareholders will 
bear at least a portion of the costs associated with the executive's continued 
employment. The fraction of the firm's outstanding common shares controlled 
by the incumbent executive (SHARES) was used as a proxy for the executive's 
ability to impose transaction costs on outside shareholders' recontracting 
12 Principal component analysis [Harman (1976)] was used to identify the common dimensions 
underlying the managerial ability variables (SALES GROWTH, PROFITS, and RETURNS).  A 
factor loading in excess of 0.60 was required for a variable to be retained in the analysis and all 
three variables satisfied this criterion. The principal component analysis produced a relatively 
'clean' single-factor solution (factor loadings ranged from 0.68 to 0.83) and explained 56.3% of the 
cross-sectional variance in the original set of variables. The factor coefficients obtained from this 
solution were used to define the composite variable ABILITY as a weighted linear combination of 
the original (standardized) variables, as indicated in eq. (2). 
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initiatives since the more shares an incumbent executive controls, the more 
difficult it is for outside shareholders to force the executive's dismissal or 
demotion, or reduce the executive's compensation. 13 The costs shareholders 
bear as a consequence of the combination of poor executive performance and 
executive-imposed transaction costs is represented by the variable SCOST,  
defined as 
S C O S T  = A B I L I T Y .  S H A R E S  if A B I L I T Y <  0, 
= 0, otherwise. 
(3) 
In this scenario, lower S C O S T  values imply that outside shareholders bear 
higher continued employment costs, costs that are avoided if the executive dies. 
Therefore, the variable S C O S T  is predicted to be negatively correlated with 
announcement period excess returns. 
On the other hand, if the executive's performance has led to favorable 
reassessments of his abilities (positive values for A B I L I T Y )  and shareholders 
can impose transaction costs on the incumbent executive's recontracting ini- 
tiatives (deter voluntary departure or wage recontracting), then at least a 
portion of the benefits associated with the executive's continued employment 
will accrue to shareholders. Transaction costs incurred by an executive who 
voluntarily terminates the employment relationship include the loss of deferred 
compensation, non-vested retirement benefits, and so on. Unfortunately, the 
limited disclosure of these aspects of compensation, and the lack of sufficient 
information to assess their significance to executive wealth, precludes their use 
as measures of transaction costs associated with the executive's voluntary 
departure. 
An alternative approach recognizes that ownership of the firm's common 
shares enables the incumbent executive to capture a portion of the continued 
employment benefits that would otherwise accrue only to outside shareholders. 
The remaining benefits, which the executive could capture only by terminating 
the employment contract and re-entering the managerial labor market, de- 
crease as the executive's shareholdings increase. In this sense, the S H A R E S  
variable provides a measure of the degree to which the executive is unwilling to 
incur the transaction costs of accepting alternative employment opportunities 
with a higher current compensation package. Favorable ability reassessment, in 
conjunction with large share ownership by the executive, enables shareholders 
to capture some of the economic benefits associated with the executive's 
continued employment. The combination of high executive performance and 
executive share ownership is represented by the variable SBENEFIT,  defined 
13As a shareholder, the poorly performing incumbent  executive also bears a portion of these 
continued employment  costs. We assume that a rational executive will remain an employee of the 
firm as long as the expected benefits from employment  (e.g., compensation in excess of a 
market-clearing price) are greater than the costs imposed on the executive as a shareholder. 
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as  
S B E N E F I T  = A B I L I T Y .  S H A R E S  
= 0  
if ABILITY >_ O, 
(4) 
otherwise. 
To the extent that SHARES is a measure of the executive's willingness to 
forego alternative employment opportunities, the variable SBENEFIT is pre- 
dicted to be negatively correlated with announcement period excess returns. 
However, large shareholdings may also enable an incumbent executive to force 
wage recontracting when abilities are favorably reassessed, and to thereby 
capture all of the continued employment benefits through increased compensa- 
tion. If this latter possibility occurs, the variable SBENEFIT will be uncorre- 
lated with announcement period excess returns. 
The final form of the cross-sectional regression model (with the predicted 
signs) is given by 
sj= ,80 + ,81 ( FNDRj) + f12 (POSITIONj) + ,83 (ABILITYj.) 
(+) (-) (-) 
+ ,84 (SCOSTj) + ,85 (SBENEFITj),  (5) 
(-) (-) 
where sj denotes cumulative standardized excess return for the j th  sample firm 
over the three-day period beginning on the trading day of the executive's 
death. The analysis in section 2 predicts that /31 should be positive and the 
remaining coefficients (f12, ~3' ,84 and fls) should be negative. 
Proxy statements served as the principal source of executive compensation 
and share ownership data, although occasionally these data were obtained 
from 10-K filings. Firm-specific and industry median data required for the 
computation of SALES GROWTH, PROFITS, and RETURNS variables 
were obtained from various issues of The Fortune Directory of the Largest U.S. 
Industrial Corporations as well as from Fortune's retailing, transportation, 
utilities, and diversified services directories. In a handful of cases it was 
necessary to supplement these data sources by obtaining firm-specific financial 
information directly from 10-K filings or by computing annual shareholder 
returns from the monthly CRSP data file. Three firms were deleted from the 
cross-sectional analysis because executive compensation and share ownership 
data were not available. 
4. 4. Cross-sectional test results 
The cross-sectional regression model was estimated over two event subsam- 
pies: all sample firms with available data (n = 50) and those sample firms 
where the executive's death did not involve a 'brief illness' (n = 44). Table 6 
presents regression results estimated over each subsample. Bivariate correlation 
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The coefficient estimates reported in table 6 indicate that standardized 
excess returns are positively related to founder status (FNDR) and managerial 
ability (ABILITY) .  Negative coefficient estimates were obtained for managerial 
decision-making responsibility (POSITION) and the two managerial 
abi l i ty / t ransact ion costs variables (SCOST and SBENEFIT). The estimated 
coefficients for FNDR, POSITION, and SCOST are statistically different 
from zero at the 10% level. However, neither the ABILITY variable nor the 
SBENEF1T variable appear to exert a significant influence on standardized 
excess returns. The intercept coefficient is positive and statistically significant. 
The adjusted R2's  of the two cross-sectional regressions are approximately 
25% (F-statistics in excess of 4.20), indicating that the independent variables 
examined here explain a relatively large proportion of the cross-sectional 
variance in excess returns. Exclusion of the 'brief illness' subsample did not 
alter the results significantly. 14 
As a partial validation of the results in table 6, the cross-sectional regression 
model was estimated using the standardized excess returns for each of the 10 
trading days (t_ 10 through t_ 1) in the pre-announcement period. None of the 
independent variables exhibited a consistent and significant association with 
pre-announcement period daily standardized excess returns, although five of 
the fifty individual coefficient estimates (corresponding to four different inde- 
pendent  variables) were statistically significant. The adjusted R 2 's ranged from 
0.0% to 5.5% (F-statistics of 0.16 to 2.50) across the ten pre-announcement 
period regressions. 
In summary, the most notable properties of the coefficient estimates in table 
6 are: (i) the significant positive founder status coefficient, (i.i) the significant 
negative managerial position and poor performance/share ownership interac- 
tion coefficients, and (iii) the absence of a statistically significant coefficient for 
managerial ability and high performance/share ownership interaction. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This study examined the common stock price reaction to the sudden death 
of a senior corporate executive. The evidence indicates that (1) sudden execu- 
tive deaths have little systematic impact on average common stock returns 
during the trading period beginning the day the executive died and ending the 
day the Wall Street Journal obituary notice is published; and (2) announce- 
14The cross-sectional regression model was also estimated using standardized excess returns 
cumulated over the firm-specific announcement period (see footnote a of table 5) as the dependent 
variable. Results similar to those reported in table 6 for the 3-day cumulation period were 
obtained. In particular, the negative estimated coefficients for P O S I T I O N  and SCOST,  and the 
positive estimated coefficient for FNDR were statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
estimated coefficients for A B I L I T Y  and S B E N E F I T  were not significantly different from zero. 
The adjusted R 2 for the regression model estimated over all 50 observations was 43.7% ( F  = 8.60), 
and virtually identical results were obtained when the 'br ief  illness' subsample was excluded. 
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ment period excess returns were characterized by increased cross-sectional 
dispersion suggesting that positive and negative stock price adjustments to the 
executives' deaths occurred. Therefore, it appears that characteristics of the 
employment relationship and the labor market for managers produce signifi- 
cant differences between the stream of net benefits which shareholders expect 
from the incumbent executive and that stream expected from a replacement. 
To gain insights into the factors which cause differences between incumbent 
and replacement executives' net benefits to shareholders, a cross-sectional 
regression model was estimated using standardized excess returns as the 
dependent variable. The incumbent executive's status as a corporate founder 
was positively related to excess returns, perhaps reflecting differences between 
founder-managers and professional managers in their initial contracting'with 
shareholders. That is, a corporate founder appears to receive a larger share of 
the benefits from employment contracting than does a professional manager 
who succeeds the founder. Excess returns are negatively associated with the 
executive's position in the firm's decision-making hierarchy, as reflected in the 
executive's compensation relative to other officers. This result may reflect 
the level and uniqueness of firm-specific (or position-specific) human capital 
which an executive acquires, making the death of a subordinate or of a retired 
CEO who retained chairmanship of the board of directors less costly to 
shareholders than the death of a CEO. 
The results concerning the relationship between excess returns and recent 
firm performance are more complicated to interpret. It appears that the change 
in expected value of managerial services is not a direct function of recent firm 
performance. However, the combination of poor performance and large 
shareholdings by the executive appears to be associated with greater announce- 
ment period excess returns. We interpret this result to mean that larger 
shareholdings enable the executive to impose transaction costs on outside 
shareholders' recontracting initiatives. The results for the combination of good 
performance and share ownership were not significant, probably indicating our 
lack of success in measuring shareholders' ability to impose transaction costs 
on the incumbent executive's recontracting initiatives. 
Interpretation of these results is complicated by several theoretical and 
empirical limitations. For example, the correlations between the founder 
variable and share ownership (SHARES) is +0.63, making it difficult to 
separate the effects of such variables. 15 In addition, the theoretical arguments 
15 The unexpected death of a senior corporate officer with significant share ownership may signal 
an increase in the probability of a takeover, and thus may give rise to a positive share price 
adjustment reflecting the tender offer premium that accompanies takeover attempts. To investigate 
this possibility, the Wall Street Journal Index entries for each sample company were examined for 
news releases regarding an attempted takeover during the two years following the executive's 
death. Evidence of an attempted takeover was found in 6 cases (11.3% of the sample); however, 
these firms experienced a modest negative stock price reaction to the executive's death (mean 
announcement  period standardized excess return of - 0.61; Z = - 1.47). 
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presented in section 2 are admittedly incomplete. In the absence of a well- 
developed theory linking managerial abilities, employment contract character- 
istics and external labor market opportunities to shareholder cash flows, the 
selection of appropriate independent variables for cross-sectional tests remains 
problematic. Nevertheless, our results shed some light on the employment 
relationship between shareholders and executives and on the factors determin- 
ing the shareholder wealth effects of an executive's continued employment. 
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